This paper offers a grammatical investigation of some important aspects of our moral life taking a scene from the movie Mr. Deeds Goes to Town as a test case. The main question I try to answer is whether there are situations in our moral discussions in which the proper and rational attitude is to show disagreement (e.g. by expressing indignation), as opposed to continuing the dialogue. Many philosophers seem committed to a conception of moral reasoning that takes as its end rational agreement among agents; from that perspective, expressing indignation would just amount to an irrational way of trying to get rid of the burdens put upon the agent's shoulders in the context of a moral discussion. Against that widespread view I will defend a Cavellian version of moral perfectionism, which takes rational disagreement as a legitimate (and even productive) outcome of moral arguments. That view, as we shall see, will be predicated upon a distinctive understanding of practical rationality, hence the importance of comparing moral discussion to other forms of rational engagement (e.g., aesthetic, scientific and mathematical).
Introduction
This paper tries to elucidate some important aspects of our practical rationality by means of grammatical reminders that call attention to particularities of our forms of life as they get expressed and articulated in our ordinary language. The immediate provocation for this paper was a shocking claim made by the Wittgensteinian philosopher Stanley Cavell when commenting a scene from the movie Mr. Deeds Goes to Town 2 . The protagonist of that movie is Longfellow Deeds (Gary Cooper), a simple countryside man who made a living by writing poems for postcards, until he unexpectedly inherited a fortune from a millionaire uncle and moved to his mansion in New York. As one might have expected, Deed's story drew a lot of attention from the local press, which came to nickname him "the Cinderella Man". In the scene that interests me Deeds goes out to dinner at a restaurant whose advertising states that there you can "eat with the literati." Seated at a large about Deeds, and when informed of his presence invite him to join the group. Knowing that Deeds writes poems, the intellectuals begin to ask questions about his writing methods, in a condescending and mocking tone. After a while Deeds realizes their true intentions, and leaves the table shouting: "I guess I found out that all famous people aren't big people." Two writers protest trying to prevent his departure, causing Deeds to knock both down by punching them.
Morally speaking, how are we to assess this situation? There seems to be no doubt that the writers acted wrongly, thus deserving some kind of rebuke. But what about Deeds specific reaction -knocking them down; was it legitimate or appropriate?
In an abstract and decontextualized analysis of the episode, it is likely that many of us would feel inclined to condemn Deeds attitude; yet for those of us who are familiar with the details of the scene it will be almost inevitable to conclude that at the very least
Deeds was right to express his indignation, in one way or another. (I describe here an impression shared by many other viewers who saw the film with me in class.) Of course punching someone is a somewhat radical way to do that, but then again we must remember that this was not Deed's first reaction, and it was raised only after the failed attempt to verbally express his indignation. Leaving aside, for now, the question of acceptable degrees of reaction, the point I would like to explore is this: are there situations in our moral discussions in which the (morally and rationally) proper attitude is to show indignation (say), as opposed to continuing the dialogue?
One of the reasons why this question interests me is that it can help us articulate some reminders about the nature and purpose of a moral discussion, hence about the very nature of our practical rationality. Many philosophers seem committed to a conception of moral reasoning that takes as its end rational agreement among agents.
Such a conception, taken literally, excludes (almost by definition) the kind of outcome presented above from the scope of morality; from that perspective, expressing indignation would just amount to an irrational way of trying to get rid of the burdens put upon the agent's shoulders in the context of a moral discussion.
In a passage that alludes to the scene I just described Cavell takes the opposite stance, arguing that "to discover our community a few will have to be punched out, made speechless in their efforts to usurp or devalue the speech of others" (Cavell 2004, 207 assumption, but because they perceive that ordinary moral arguments fall short of the standard of rationality employed in the context of scientific disputes, they end up excluding morality from the realm of rational assessment, relegating it to the "expression of feelings."
In agreement with Ayer and other non-cognitivists, Cavell thinks it is unrealistic to expect that moral arguments should lead to conclusions that everyone must accept; but disagreement about those conclusions does not need to be taken as an index of a general failure of (practical) rationality, anymore than a failure in ordinary One of the distinctive features of scientific rationality is precisely the fact that it is expected that competent users of its patterns of argument must agree in their conclusions; in other words, agreement itself is, in these cases, an index of competence, and hence of rationality. But there are other types of rationality, such as those expressed in aesthetic and moral discussions. In general, it can be said that a discussion is rational to the extent that the judgments made by the interlocutors involved in it are supported by reasons; but nothing, short of a tacit commitment to an intellectualist or scientificist conception of rationality forces us to think that the ability to provide reasons should be identified with the ability to apply general (a priori?) principles to particular cases, or with the ability to extract general rules from the experience of multiple instances. Kant himself, who is usually considered a paradigmatic exponent of this intellectualist conception of practical rationality, has noticed the peculiarity of aesthetic judgments, whose operation does not follow inductive nor deductive logic, but by no means excluded them from the scope of rationality, or put into question their claim of objectivity or even universality 3 . The kind of competence that matters in the case of aesthetic judgments is a subject's highly developed ability to detect what might be called "aesthetic saliences", i.e., objective aspects or features of the phenomena at the basis of his or her aesthetic experience, thus anchoring his or her judgment on such aspects.
Cavell summarizes this point by saying that "The problem of the critic, as of the artist, is not to discount his subjectivity but to include it; not to overcome it in agreement but to master it in exemplary ways" (1976, 94). Thus, an aesthetic judgment can be seen as a critic's invitation for others to share her experience of a work, and it is for this reason that Cavell argues that:
It is essential to making an aesthetic judgment that at some point we be prepared to say in its support: don't you see, don't you hear, don't you dig?
The best critic will know the best points. Because if you do not see something, without explanation, then there is nothing further to discuss. (1976, 93) That last sentence is critical for my purposes; as Wittgenstein asserted in a different context "explanation must come to an end somewhere" (Wittgenstein 2001 , §1), and knowing when and how to stop in a specific context is also an important indication of a subject's competence in a particular domain of discussion 4 . Anticipating some results, I would like to argue that something similar should also apply to moral arguments, that being the reason why they may end up abruptly, without this being a sign of irrationality. But before I can do that I need to emphasize this important difference between the kinds of agreement expected in the respective fields of aesthetics and science: in the latter agreement is guaranteed precisely by the exclusion of subjectivity, in the former it depends essentially on a controlled or exemplar use of it. It is precisely because of this characteristic that aesthetic and moral arguments, unlike scientific ones, will allow their participants to unveil, for themselves and for others, intimate aspects of themselves, articulating and making intelligible the positions they are adopting, and by which they are taking responsibility. Herein lies the interest, but also the risk which is peculiar to aesthetic and moral discussions: they provide an important opportunity for participants to develop their individuality and identity, stimulating an increase in self-knowledge as well as the construction or discovery of a community; but agreement is not always forthcoming, failure is always possible, and it might result in the subject's discovery of her own confusion and opacity, which can in turn lead to humiliation, rejection and ultimately to isolation. does and who she is. If, for example, someone makes a promise then she is committed to performing a course of action; should she fail to perform that action, then, in order to retain credibility as a moral agent, she must explain why the circumstances in which she found herself justified her failure to honour that commitment, why she could not have given advance warning to those relying upon her promise, and so on. (Mulhall 1994, 37) As an agent cannot simply fail to take seriously his own previous commitments, on pain of being exiled from the moral realm, neither can a person be considered morally responsible who seeks to criticize the behavior of another agent without taking into account (or at least without making an effort to try to understand) the commitments and concerns of that agent. In other words, (competent) moral evaluations should not focus excessively (let alone exclusively) on the set of actions and choices of a subject at a given time, but should be made against the background of his previous cares and commitments. The mistake to be avoided is taking the identity of a moral being as a mere sum of (right or wrong) "discrete" actions or choices, and the alternative is to focus on their narrative identity, which, although subject to continual change, is usually far from being completely unstable 5 .
If the description of the logic of moral reasoning presented so far is in the right tracks, then we can conclude that moral arguments will be competent to the extent in which they exhibit an appeal to at least two kinds of reasons, which Cavell dubs, respectively, "basis of care" and "grounds of commitment": the first "provides whatever Here is another important difference between moral and scientific discussions: the latter seek to determine whether a certain cognitive claim is to be accepted based on the evidence presented by someone, as well as on her general competence in the field; but in the case of a moral discussion what really matters is to determine whether we can understand and respect (but not necessarily agree with) positions or attitudes assumed by others. Instead of the adequacy of a claim to certain universal and impersonally established principles, moral reasoning is constructed in terms of responsiveness between agents, and puts to the test the quality and, ultimately, the very possibility of creating or maintaining a relationship based on shared cares and commitments. This difference is presented by Cavell as follows: The ability to maintain a moral relationship depends essentially on the cares and commitments at stake -and we will be willing to require or to tolerate more or less what is at stake is whether A really is in a position to assume that attitude responsibly, given her own previous commitments. In summary, B is accusing A of being a hypocrite, and, given that in her reply A does nothing more than confirm that accusation, B ends up concluding that they live in a different moral universe, and that she may have been misled about A up to now. It is in this sense that one can say (as does Mulhall) that "moral discussion is an arena for the revelation of one self to another" (Mulhall 1994 : 41).
Perfectionism and the limits of morality
In the dialogue just analyzed we were presented to a momentary disagreement between agents that could, at least in principle, find new grounds to carry on the discussion (one should not overlook the importance of time and patience in mundane affairs). But there are cases where a conflict could end up putting morality as a whole into question, and that, according to Cavell, simply indicates that morality should be seen as limited in its potential, leaving room for ideas like the "salvation of the self through the repudiation of morality" (CR 269), which, as we shall see, already points to the theme of "moral perfectionism" which will be explored more systematically in Recall that, according to our previous analysis, the hallmark of moral reasoning is that it must meet the requirement of intelligibility 6 . But, as Cavell suggests in another context, that still leaves many questions unanswered, such as, for example:
whether there are limits to the obligation to be intelligible, whether everyone isn't entitled to a certain obscurity or sense of confusion, and at some times I want to emphasize three points from this passage: first, it suggests that it is possible to distinguish between justified and unjustified anger and hatred, and, second, it also states that even in those cases where those feelings (and their consequences) are justified, we are still required to make them intelligible and (to that extent) take responsibility for them. Clearly we are not here thinking of those cases in which we regret an assault of anger immediately after the fact; the interesting case is that in which, all things considered, we remain convinced, at least partially, that our attitude was appropriate to the situation (think of B after saying goodbye to her friend A). I say "partially" because in real life (but also in good literature and in good movies!) things are not so simple, and we are not always clear about our own motivations. That's whyand here's the third point I want to emphasize -Cavell closes the passage calling attention to the fact that, at least on some occasions, the demand for intelligibility will make us reconsider the situation, "putting aside" our first reaction.
Consider again the abrupt conclusion of the discussion between Deeds and the literati, due to the former's feeling of indignation. In that case, to whom exactly would Deeds own justifications and explanations? It does not seem plausible to think that he owns them to the literati themselves -at least not immediately. That discussion is momentarily closed, and the best one can hope is that, after both parties had time to coolly reconsider their attitudes and motivations, against the background of their cares and commitments, a plea for excuses can be made, allowing them to resume their difficult to take the next step toward that ideal, the "further self", so I need some kind of external attraction. A friend may provide such an attraction, as she can reveal our own flaws -make ourselves confront our confusion -in a way that will not generate much resistance, given her specific moral stance in relation to our "cares and commitments."
The friend does not confront me providing impersonal reasons, but from a position which she occupies in relation to those commitments. Now if some willingness to understand and to be understood is necessary for moral argument, then it is easy to see how a context of friendship and mutual respect is particularly suitable for that purpose.
It is especially in this kind of context that we can move forward in our moral education -an education which, according to Cavell, is not intended primarily "to provide an increase of learning but a transformation of existence" (Cavell 2005, 325) 12 .
But to say that a context of friendship is particularly suited to advance our moral education is not to say that we can only move forward in such contexts. As a friend warned, "enemies and strangers can also teach us something about the morality of our conduct. We learn definitive lessons listening to what we do not want to, from those we barely know" 13 . Certainly; however, it seems to me that this will only be possible in cases in which even our enemies or strangers share at least some of our own commitments and cares. 14 The only scenario which is being excluded as conducive to The films with which Cavell is concerned portray the protagonists's effort (but not necessarily their success) to become better people, choosing a better way of life 20 . By insisting on the relevance of including these films in the set of texts that explore perfectionist themes Cavell does not want to give the impression that "philosophy left to itself requires compensation by the revelations within the medium of film" (Cavell 2004, 5-6) , but, on the contrary, he wants to indicate that these films can be thought of as differently configuring intellectual and emotional avenues that philosophy is already in exploration of, but which, perhaps, it has cause sometimes to turn from prematurely, particularly in its forms since its professionalization, or academization [...]. The implied claim is that film, the latest of the great arts, shows philosophy to be the often invisible accompaniment of the ordinary
